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Abstract 
This paper tries to explain why high inflation levels persist during long periods 
of time, in several countries affected by chronic inflation, without the necessary 
corrective measures being implemented. Political models of conflict explain these 
delays as the result of coordination problems caused by collective choice-making 
mechanisms. The empirical results of a tobit model estimated over a panel of 10 
countries affected by chronic inflation and covering 43 years of observations show that 
more fragmented political systems and those with a large number of parties represented 
in the parliament present greater delays of inflation stabilizations. Since higher 
fragmentation foments conflicts of interest, I conclude that such conflicts are one of the 
main causes of those delays in chronic inflation countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the last decades several countries affected by chronic inflation have followed 
non-optimal and unsustainable policies for long periods of time. These policies caused 
economic disequilibria and led to high public deficits and untenable debts. The use of 
seigniorage revenues to finance the public deficits aggravated the disequilibria and 
generated extremely high inflation levels. Although these policies were recognized as 
sub-optimal from a social standpoint, the necessary deficit and inflation stabilization 
programs were often delayed. This generated persistent and high inflation levels in 
those countries during long periods of time. Thus, a question arises: Why were those 
high inflation levels maintained during so long without the necessary stabilization 
measures being implemented? This is the main question I will try to answer in this 
paper. 
Many authors try to explain the delays in reforms by accusing politicians of 
myopia or irrational behavior, or arguing that countries do not have the ability or the 
technical competence necessary to carry out the reforms. Others argue that the delays 
are the rational and deliberate choice of a policymaker that tries to maximize a social 
welfare function. These explanations are not convincing. More appealing explanations 
are given by the political models of conflict, which assume that policy choices result 
from negotiations between competing interest groups, and explain the delays by 
coordination problems caused by collective choice-making mechanisms. 
Looking only at this literature, I hypothesize that the answer to the question 
previously formulated could be in the conflicts between competing interest groups. As 
conflicts of interest are inherent to more fragmented political systems, in which it is 
more difficult to achieve the necessary consensus to implement the required measures, I 
conjecture that in those political systems the delays of inflation stabilization will be 
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longer. This is the main hypothesis to test in this paper. Nonetheless, other hypotheses 
will be formulated according with this literature, and tested in order to identify the main 
(political and economic) causes of the delays of inflation stabilization. To do so, I 
estimate a tobit model for a panel of 10 countries affected by chronic inflation, covering 
43 years of observations (1957-1999). 
Several other studies have already analyzed the effects of political fragmentation 
and instability on seigniorage, budget deficits, debt, inflation, and on the probability of 
starting an inflation stabilization program. Nevertheless, no other study tests the 
influence of the political fragmentation on the delay of inflation stabilization as directly 
as this. The option for the tobit model allows the use of the delay as the dependent 
variable and, in this way, I can directly test the impact of several political and economic 
factors on the delay of inflation stabilization. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some evidence on the 
delays of inflation stabilization. Section 3 describes some theoretical explanations for 
the delays of reforms. The data, the econometric model, and the assumptions to test are 
presented in section 4. The empirical results are analyzed in section 5. The last section 
summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
2. Delays of inflation stabilizations 
Before the World War I episodes of high inflation were rare, which in 
accordance with Végh (1992) was the reflex of the prevalence of convertible currencies 
and commodities monies. However, in the aftermath of World War I hyperinflation1 
                                                 
1 Hyperinflation corresponds to a monthly inflation rate of at least 50% and tends to have a short duration, 
sometimes of just a few months. 
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began to affect some European countries: Austria, Germany, Hungry, and Poland.2 The 
speed by which the inflationary process was eliminated was one of the characteristics of 
the reforms implemented by these countries. 
After World War II, when hyperinflation had already achieved notoriety, a new 
phenomenon began to emerge: chronic inflation.3 Some countries, particularly in Latin 
America, began to endure high (relative to industrial countries) and persistent rates of 
inflation, which in some cases have lasted up to the last decade. In Table 1 (column 1) 
the main countries that were affected by this phenomenon are identified. I also include 
in this group Israel and Turkey (non-Latin America countries), because they also 
suffered from chronic inflation. 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
Today, it is commonly accepted that high inflation levels registered in these 
countries are intimately related to the use of non-optimal and unsustainable policies, 
like monetizing the public deficit. Bruno (1993) also argues that high inflation levels are 
the result of internal political and economic crises, failure in response to external 
shocks, and growing debt. Bernholz (1995) sees this phenomenon as a result of the 
electoral game in which policymakers try to benefit some groups in order to obtain 
political support. Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995) synthesize these ideas concluding 
that the political factors that influence the policymakers’ behavior lead to budget 
deficits, which induce the money creation, causing a higher growth of prices and, 
consequently, a higher inflation. 
                                                 
2 For a complete study of this reality see Sargent (1982). 
3 In literature, chronic inflation is commonly defined as a high inflation relative to that of industrial 
countries and that lasts for a long period of time (for several years). 
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High inflation must be eliminated because it involves high costs and generates 
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. In this way, it is convenient to take some 
measures in order to diminish it. Indeed, several stabilization programs were 
implemented in the countries previously pointed out in order to reduce inflation to 
stable levels (see Table 1, column 2). These stabilization programs were essentially of 
two kinds (see Table 1, column 3): money-based stabilization programs (MBS); and 
exchange rate-based stabilization programs (ERBS).4 
Before proceeding, I would like to notice that the kind and dates of 
implementation of the stabilization programs presented in Table 1 were collected from 
the literature related with inflation stabilizations.5 Nevertheless, I only collected those 
programs that constituted true and credible attempts of inflation stabilization because 
those are the ones that constitute the most relevant chronic inflation stabilizations and 
the ones that received greatest attention in the economics literature.6 Although I have 
followed an episodic approach in searching for stabilization attempts some authors use a 
mechanical approach7 identifying the stabilizations in accordance with a mathematical 
rule for inflation behavior. The mechanical approach is more flexible, permitting the 
inclusion of more countries and programs (not referred in the literature) in the sample, 
                                                 
4 MBS aims to stabilize inflation and the deficit using a target for money growth as the nominal anchor, 
while exchange rate is used to maintain external equilibrium. ERBS combine the fight to inflation and the 
budget deficit adjustment with a target for the exchange rate, without any specific preoccupation with the 
growth of the money supply. 
5 See last column of Table 1. 
6 Other programs were implemented, but they did not represent credible attempts of inflation stabilization, 
so I did not include them in this study. For a more complete description of all inflation stabilization 
programs implemented in the countries presented in Table 1, see Castro and Veiga (forthcoming). 
7 See, for instance, Easterly (1996) and Hamann (1999). 
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but it tends to bias the sample to well succeeded programs, including some programs 
that did not exist, ignoring failed stabilization attempts. Because of these problems, I 
chose the episodic approach. 
As already stated, and contrarily to the hyperinflations registered in the 1920s, 
which were quickly eliminated with low costs for output, chronic inflation that affected 
several Latin America countries since the 1960s took much longer to be eliminated. 
Looking at Table 1 (column 4) the persistence of “high” inflation is evident.8 In some 
cases it lasts for several years.9 Numerous were the attempts to stabilize inflation but, 
despite their relative success, they were rarely implemented on the right time, that is, 
when they began to be necessary, or when inflation started to reach high levels. And, 
sometimes no concrete program seems to be implemented (see Table 1). Consequently, 
inflation was reaching higher and persistent levels without the necessary stabilization 
measures being adopted. Therefore, a question arises: Why did inflation persist high for 
so long without the necessary and adequate stabilization measures being implemented? 
Or alternatively: Why was there such a long delay in the implementation of credible 
inflation stabilization programs? 
This is the main question that I will try to answer in the empirical work. But, 
previously, I will present some theoretical justifications appointed in the literature for 
the delay in the implementation of efficient reforms. 
 
                                                 
8 Following Veiga (2000), “High” inflation is defined as twice the average inflation rate of the last 10 
years (and superior to 25%) or greater than or equal to 100%. 
9 Bruno (1993) sustains that the relative stability of the inflationary process was the result of the high 
degree of monetary accommodation of the nominal variables to the lagged changes in the price level. 
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3. Theoretical explanations for the delays of reforms 
In the literature there are basically three alternative collections of explanations 
for the delay of economically efficient reforms.10 These reforms might improve the 
aggregate welfare but, as previously noticed, they are not always implemented with the 
necessary speed. 
The first explanation assumes myopia or irrationality of policy-makers. Some 
countries postpone the necessary reforms because they do not perceive that these are 
unavoidable. This argument is unconvincing: many times the evidence for the necessity 
of a reform is incontestable. Several authors also believe that some countries do not 
possess the necessary expertise to put the reforms into practice, so they wait that things 
get better by themselves or that a greater crisis forces them to act. Nevertheless, this 
argument is criticizable because it is not rational, once the more a country waits, the 
more painful the reform becomes. 
The second explanation is based on an optimal control framework and assumes 
that delays are rational and a deliberate choice of a policy-maker maximizing a social 
welfare function. In these models delay is optimal if the costs of living under inflation 
are smaller than the costs of implementing a successful stabilization program. 
Nevertheless, this approach does not explain why some countries do not stabilize when 
there are good conditions for doing so and why several other stabilizations are 
implemented without the optimal conditions. 
Finally, political models of conflict assume that policy choices result from 
negotiations between contending interest groups, and explain deviations from optimality 
(delays) by coordination problems caused by the mechanisms of making collective 
                                                 
10 For a complete survey, see for instance, Alesina (1994), Drazen (1996, 2000), and Rodrik (1993, 1996). 
This division of the explanations for delays in three groups follows Veiga (2000). 
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choices. Effectively, this explanation makes more sense. Presenting a more consistent 
theoretical explanation for the postponement of efficient reforms, political models of 
conflict achieve a particular importance. 
Some references related with these approaches are presented below. Although 
most of this literature deals with the fiscal stabilization (stabilization in the budget 
deficit or in the ratio of public debt to GDP), their conclusions are also applicable to 
inflation stabilization, since one must accompany the other. 
 
3.1 Distributional conflict 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) present a model in which delays of fiscal 
stabilization result from the failure of rival interest groups to agree on a deficit reduction 
program. Indeed, each group attempts to shift the burden of stabilization onto other 
groups. This situation leads to a “war of attrition” in which agreement on a stabilization 
program is only reached when one of the groups concedes, that is, accepts paying a 
higher proportion of the taxes in order to eliminate the deficit. Concession happens only 
when the marginal benefit of waiting equals the marginal benefit of conceding. In this 
model, one important factor leading to delays is the degree of political polarization and 
fragmentation among interest groups. 
Drazen and Grilli (1993) extend the model of Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
emphasizing the possible benefits of economic crises. They argue that crises and 
emergency situations can force the adoption of stabilization programs. In fact, an 
exogenous shock that aggravates the economic conditions (higher costs of delaying) 
may be welfare improving, in the sense that reveals the loser faster conducing to an 
earlier agreement to stabilize. Consequently, higher costs resulting from higher inflation 
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may hasten stabilization, as long as measures are not used to fade the reduction caused 
in welfare by these costs.11 
Labán and Sturzenegger (1994a, 1994b) build a model in which class conflicts 
between the rich and the poor and adjustment costs lead to delays of stabilization in the 
context of the Latin American debt crisis. They assume that the rich protect their 
income from inflation tax using a financial adaptation technology (capital flight), which 
is not available to the poor. As capital flight increases, the base for distortionary taxes 
diminishes and inflation has to increase in order to generate enough receipts to finance 
the deficit, leading to higher welfare costs to the poor. As their relative situation gets 
worse they will accept to support a disproportionate share of the adjustment costs and 
an agreement to stabilize will be reached. The authors conclude that factors like higher 
costs of stabilization, lower costs of inflation, and lower costs of financial adaptation 
may increase the delays. 
Casella and Eichengreen (1996) introduce in the model of Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) the analysis of the impact of foreign aid on the timing of stabilizations. They 
conclude that only aid that is decided upon and delivered soon enough could clearly 
increase welfare in the receiving country. This conclusion confers a character of 
ambiguity to foreign aid, which is also sustained by Rodrik (1996). He argues that it can 
hasten stabilization by reducing its costs, but the prospect of aid can also lead 
contending groups to postpone necessary sacrifices until it arrives, leading to a delay of 
stabilization. Because of this last possibility, Bruno and Easterly (1996) argue that an 
extra-incentive to stabilize might be a cut of foreign aid to high inflation countries. 
                                                 
11 Notice that, the use of wage and prices indexation mechanisms may fade the welfare loss caused by 
higher inflation and, in this way, may postpone stabilization. 
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Finally, Hsieh (2000) considers the delays as the outcome of a bargaining game 
between two parties and, like Alesina and Drazen (1991), concludes that a settlement is 
only reached when the benefit from delay is smaller than the cost of continued 
inefficient policies. He also notes that a crisis that increases the welfare loss from not 
stabilizing and a cut in foreign aid will lower the delay. 
 
3.2 Political instability 
Alesina and Tabellini (1989) developed a model in which political instability 
and polarization lead to over-accumulation of external debt, capital flight, low domestic 
investment, and, consequently, may also lead to delays in reforms. Although not 
directly related to stabilizations, their model shows how inefficient outcomes (delays of 
efficient reforms, for instance) can be caused by political instability and polarization. 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) present evidence for several OECD countries that 
higher fragmented political systems lead to higher public debts.12 They found that 
countries with a large number of parties represented in Parliament, in which one-party 
overall majority is difficult to obtain, tend to present higher debts. As minority 
governments do not possess the necessary political stability, cohesion and support, 
agreements are harder to obtain and stabilizations are delayed. In sum, they conclude 
that multiparty systems with coalition governments may have more difficulties in 
achieving a quick agreement to stabilize. 
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and Roubini (1991) prove that an 
increase in the degree of political instability, generally associated with frequent changes 
                                                 
12 Using data for several Latin American countries, Veiga (2000) shows empirically that a higher 
fragmentation of the political system conducts to a lower propensity to implement an inflation 
stabilization program. He also finds that a higher inflation hastens the implementation of a program. 
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of government, tends to lead to a higher use of seigniorage and to higher budget 
deficits.13 Therefore, political instability may have an important role in explaining 
inflation gaps between countries. 
Haggard and Kaufman (1992) add that governments in less fragmented political 
systems, such as authoritarian regimes, are less exposed to political pressures and may 
quickly build the necessary consensus for the reform. Thus, they sustain that 
authoritarian regimes might be more successful in initiating reforms than democratic 
ones.14 In opposition, Ball and Rausser (1995) argue that political repression might not 
be the best way to implement sustainable economic reforms. 
 
3.3 Uncertainty related to the stabilization results 
Fernandez e Rodrik (1991) also try to find out why governments failed in 
adopting policies able to promote efficiency. Their answer rests on the uncertainty 
related to the distribution of gains and loses generated by the reform. They conclude 
that a reform that would benefit a majority of the population may be rejected, by a 
majority of the electorate, if there is uncertainty about the agents that will benefit from 
it. This may also happen with an inflation stabilization program. 
Orphanides (1996a, 1996b) analyses the delay and abandonment of a 
stabilization program as optimal decisions by a policymaker. He argues that may be 
better to delay the program if more favorable initial conditions are expected. In this 
                                                 
13 Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) sustain that more unstable political systems tend to rely 
more on seigniorage and they also refer that the necessary reform is generally delayed when the 
incumbent government faces a small probability of reelection and high polarization. 
14 Haggard and Webb (1993) find that the theoretical support for this claim rests on crucial assumptions 
about the nature of authoritarian leadership and that the empirical evidence for the advantages of 
authoritarianism is inconclusive. 
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way, the author tries to explain the delays not recurring to the political impasse but 
assuming the rationality of the government. He considers foreign reserves as a 
determinant factor to the success of a stabilization: low levels of foreign reserves will 
probably result in delayed or abandoned stabilization programs. 
 
4. The data and the econometric model 
Based on the theoretical approaches presented above, I will proceed with an 
empirical analysis in order to point out the main causes of the delays in inflation 
stabilization verified in some countries affected by chronic inflation. 
For that propose I constructed a dataset composed of quarterly data from 1957 to 
1999, for 10 countries that experienced chronic inflation and implemented stabilization 
programs during this period.15 In order to determine when a stabilization program has 
been implemented, I searched the economics literature for information on the starting 
dates of stabilization programs in those countries. The 24 major stabilizations identified 
are described in Table 1. The other 8 “high” inflation periods, also identified in Table 1, 
and that ended without the implementation of a concrete inflation stabilization program, 
were obtained through the definition of “high” inflation used.16 
The dependent variable was constructed based on the duration of “high” 
inflation until its stabilization. I define the independent variable as the delay of inflation 
stabilization (Delay), which is measured by the duration of inflation (in consecutive 
quarters) since the first quarter in which it is considered “high”, that is, since 
stabilization measures are considered necessary, until a stabilization program has started 
                                                 
15 I thank Francisco Veiga for sharing his dataset. 
16 As indicated above, and following Veiga (2000), inflation is considered “high” when it is over twice 
the average inflation rate of the last 10 years (and superior to 25%) or greater than or equal to 100%. 
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or inflation ceased to be “high”. This variable increases one unit by each quarter of 
“high” inflation until stabilization.17 When inflation is not “high”, the dependent 
variable takes the value 0. 
A description of the dependent and independent variables used in this work is 
presented in Table 2, where I also define the political and economic variables and the 
sources where I obtained them. 
<Insert Table 2 around here> 
The data reveals that the dependent variable (Delay) takes the value 0 several 
times, which means that there is no delay (or inflation is not considered high). However, 
when it is necessary to implement a stabilization program (because inflation is high), 
the dependent variable is positive and presents some variation. Since there are several 
observations equal to 0, I opted to estimate a tobit model, censoring the dependent 
variable for all observations equal to 0.18 Using this method it is possible to centralize 
the analysis directly on the effective delay of inflation stabilizations. 
The general formulation for the tobit19 model is usually given in terms of an 
index function, which may be formalized as follows: 
(1)  iii XY εβ += '* , 
                                                 
17 When the duration of “high” inflation until the quarter before the stabilization is 0, I consider that the 
dependent variable takes the value 1 when the program is implemented. If the government considers 
necessary the implementation of a stabilization program in a given quarter, that is because inflation is 
higher than it desires. Thus, I opted to consider the smaller possible value for delay (1 quarter). 
18 As there are several observations equal to 0 for the dependent variable, ordinary least squares gives 
biased and inconsistent estimates for the coefficients associated to the independent variables (see Greene, 
2000, p. 912). In order to avoid this problem it is used a tobit model. 
19 For a description of the model see, for instance, Breen (1996), Greene (2000), Long (1997), and 
Maddala (1983). 
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where iε  is assumed to be ),0( 2σNID  and independent of iX . The index variable, also 
called the latent variable, is only observed for positive values and censored for values 
equal to 0, but the independent variables ( iX ) are observed in all cases. So, the variable 
that is observed )( iY , and that represents the Delay, is defined as follows: 
(2)  
.0
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This model describes two situations: one is the probability that 0=iY  (given iX ); and 
the other is the distribution of iY  given that it is positive. Therefore, the expected value 
of iY  (given iX ) is given by: 
(3)  
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in which σ  represents the standard error of the disturbance term, and (.)Φ  and (.)φ  
represent, respectively, the normal cumulative distribution function and the normal 
density function. 
From (3) it follows that the marginal effect on the expected value of iY  of a 
change in ikX  is given by: 
(4)  )/(
)|( ' σβΦβ ik
ik
ii X
X
XYE =∂
∂
. 
This means that the marginal effect of a change in ikX  upon the expected outcome iY  is 
given by the coefficient of the model multiplied by the probability of having a positive 
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outcome.20 Notice that if this probability is one, the marginal effect is simply kβ , as in 
the linear model estimated by the ordinary least squares method. 
The estimation of the tobit model is done trough maximum likelihood. The 
contribution to the likelihood function of an observation either equals the probability 
mass (at the observed point 0=iY ) or the conditional density of iY , given that it is 
positive, times the probability mass of observing 0>iY . Thus the log-likelihood can be 
written as: 
(5)  
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Maximization of (5) with respect to β  and 2σ  yields the maximum likelihood 
estimates. Assuming that the model is correctly specified, this gives consistent and 
asymptotic estimators for both β  and 2σ . 
This estimation method is different from that used by Veiga (2000), who 
estimated the probability of starting an inflation stabilization program in a situation of 
high inflation. Veiga (2000) searches explanations for the delays of stabilizations 
analyzing the timing of the implementation of an inflation stabilization program. My 
work relies directly on the delay and not on the timing of a stabilization program. Thus, 
the method I use allows ofr a more diret study of the causes of these delays. By using 
this alternative method of estimation I also intend to verify the main conclusions 
obtained by Veiga (2000). 
                                                 
20 Greene (2000, p. 911) and Breen (1996, p. 32) present the ratio between the number of no censored 
observations and the total number of observations as a consistent estimate for that probability, that is for 
Φ(Xi’β/σ). 
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Once presented the data and the econometric model, and before describing the 
empirical results, I advance with some assumptions about the possible impact of the 
various independent variables on the dependent variable based on the literature 
presented above. 
In order to measure the impact of the conflicts of interest on the Delay, I use the 
two proxies suggested by Veiga (2000): the degree of fragmentation of the political 
system (FPS);21 and the fragmentation index of the distribution of seats in the lower 
house of the parliament (FIP).22 According to Alesina and Drazen (1991), Alesina and 
Tabellini (1989), Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
and Veiga (2000), a more fragmented political system, which has inherent deep 
conflicts of interest, may lead to a higher delay of inflation stabilization, once that in 
such conditions it is not easy to achieve an agreement to stabilize. Thus, I expect that 
the dummy variables used to capture the effect of the degree of fragmentation of the 
political system (FSP1 and FPS2) have negative coefficients, and that FIP presents a 
positive coefficient. I also expect that the coefficient for FPS1 is greater, in absolute 
value, than the coefficient for FPS2, which means that authoritarian regimes where 
political parties are not permitted may present smaller delays in inflation stabilization, 
which is in agreement with the study of Haggard and Kaufman (1992). 
Hibbs (1977) sustains that right-wing oriented governments are relatively more 
concerned with inflation than left-wing oriented ones. This makes me believe that the 
                                                 
21 Three degrees of political fragmentation are identified. These are indicated in Table 2 as dummy 
variables: the first two (FPS1 and FPS2) will be included in the regression model; the third, which refers 
to more fragmented political systems (FPS3), will be used as the base category, so it will not be included 
in any regression. 
22 The higher this index is, the greater is the effective number of parties represented in the parliament, and 
the higher will be its fragmentation. 
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variable Orient (which takes the value of one for a right-wing oriented government, and 
zero otherwise) may present a negative coefficient, hoping that a rightist government 
will be faster to fight high inflation than a leftist one. 
Following the works of Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini (1992), and Roubini (1991) it is possible to infer that delays of inflation 
stabilization may also be caused by political instability, generally related with short 
permanence of governments in power or frequent changes of government. In order to 
capture this effect I use the variables: QLChG (number of quarters since the last change 
in government or election), NGCh5 (number of changes in government or elections that 
occurred in the last five years), and ChLY (which takes the value of one when a change 
in government or election occurred in the last year, and zero otherwise). As a higher 
political instability may cause delays of inflation stabilization, I expect a negative signal 
for the coefficient associated to QLChG, and a positive one for NGCh5 and ChLY. 
Assuming that a higher inflation brings more costs, I hypothesize, based on the 
models of Drazen and Grilli (1989) and Laban and Sturzenegger (1994a, 1994b) and on 
the empirical results of Veiga (2000), that a higher inflation (Inf) or a higher 
acceleration of the inflation rate (∆Inf) diminish delays. Therefore, I anticipate a 
negative signal for the coefficients associated to the variables Inf and ∆Inf. 
According to Orphanides (1996a, 1996b) low levels of foreign reserves will 
probably lead to delays or abandonment of stabilization programs. Consequently, I 
expect a negative coefficient for the ratio of total reserves to imports (TR/Imp). 
Realizing the ambiguous effect of external aid on stabilization, as referred by 
Casella and Eichengreen (1996) and Rodrik (1996), I decided, following Bruno and 
Easterly (1996), to assume that external aid may delay a stabilization, since it generally 
takes time until aid becomes available, and contending groups may postpone the 
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necessary sacrifices until it arrives. Consequently, this assumption implies positive 
coefficients for the variables TFC/Imp, Dur_aid, and IMFProg. 
The growth of real GDP (GDP), the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP 
(FB/GDP), and the oil price index (OPI) are not directly related with the models 
referred to above. But, it is possible that they affect the delay of inflation stabilization. 
For this reason, they will be included in the estimations as control variables. 
 
5. Empirical results 
Table 3 presents the results of the tobit estimations.23 Since tobit coefficients are 
not very intuitive, the marginal effects of the independent variables on the observed 
dependent variable, Delay, are reported. The marginal effects give the impact of one-
unit change in the regressors on the Delay for the mean probability of having a delay in 
inflation stabilization. t-Statistics for the null or no effect and the significance level at 
which the null hypotheses are rejected are also reported. Most economic variables are 
lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual 
delays in reporting of economic data. Finally, the logarithm of the likelihood function, 
the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwartz B.I.C.), the McFadden R2, the 
number of observations and the number of positive observations are reported. 
<Insert Table 3 around here> 
Country and time dummies were included in all estimations.24 They were 
statistically significant individually and jointly. I also used robust standard errors, 
                                                 
23 The econometric Package TSP 4.5 was used to estimate the regressions. 
24 Ten country dummies were created, one for each country, and 9 of them were included in the 
regressions. Four time dummies were also created, one for the 1960s (including the late 1950s), another 
for the 1970s, another for the 1980s and, finally, for the 1990s, and 3 of them were included in the 
regressions. 
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calculated trough the Eicker-White method, in order to control for heteroscedasticity 
and for some other forms of misspecification in maximum likelihood estimation. 
Results support the main assumption of this work that a higher fragmentation of 
the political system (which has inherent deeper conflicts of interest) leads to a higher 
delay of inflation stabilization. FPS1 and FPS2 are always statistically significant and 
the estimated coefficients have the expected signs.25 Furthermore, the estimated 
coefficient of FPS1 is always greater, in absolute value, than that of FPS2, which means 
that authoritarian regimes that do not allow political parties present smaller delays in 
inflation stabilization. The estimated coefficient for FIP26 also has the expected sign and 
is significant, providing evidence that more parties in the parliament lead to delays of 
stabilizations.27 All these results are in accordance with the works of Alesina and 
Drazen (1991), Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 
(1992), Roubini and Sachs (1989), Haggard and Kaufman (1992) and confirm the 
empirical results obtained by Veiga (2000) for the analysis of the probability of starting 
a stabilization program in a situation of high inflation. 
                                                 
25 Notice, for instance in column 1, that the passage from a more fragmented political system to a one-
party majority parliamentary government or a presidential government, with the same party in control of 
the parliament (with an overall majority), leads to a decrease in the Delay of about 1.1 quarters, ceteris 
paribus. As FPS2 is a dummy variable, a more precise procedure to calculate its marginal impact would 
be: [∆E(Y|X)/∆xk] = E(Y|X, xk=1) – E(Y|X, xk=0), with E(Y|X)=Φ(δ)X’β + σф(δ), in which δ=X’β/σ (see 
Long, 1997, pp. 209-210). However, as the results are not very different, this procedure is not relevant for 
the conclusions of this study. 
26 This variable was never included in the estimations with FPS1 and FPS2 because there is a high 
correlation between these variables, which could lead to problems of multicollinearity. 
27 A one-unit increase in this index leads to an increase in the Delay of about 0.18 quarters (more or less 
16 days), ceteris paribus. 
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Orient is statistically significant but its coefficient does not have the expected 
sign. Thus, the partisan theory of Hibbs (1977) is not confirmed here. This fact is not 
strange at all, since sometimes substantial policy changes are implemented by parties 
with less reputation to implement such policies, as Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) 
argue. Based in this argument, it is possible that left-wing oriented governments 
stabilize high inflation faster, as my results indicate. 
The variables introduced to capture specifically the effect of political instability 
on the delay (QLChG, NGCh5, and ChLY) are all statistically significant and their 
coefficients present the expected signs. Therefore, higher political instability (short 
permanence of governments in power or frequent changes of government) induces the 
postponement of inflation stabilizations, which is in accordance with the works of 
Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), and Roubini 
(1991). 
Considering that inflation growth lagged one period (∆Inf(-1)) might affect the 
delay to a greater extend than its level (Inf(-1)), due to the accommodation mechanisms 
used by the countries included in the sample to protect them against inflation costs, I 
opted toy include this variable in almost all regressions. However, it is never 
statistically significant. The same happens with Inf(-1) (see Table 3, column 5). This 
shows that neither the inflation level nor its growth affects the delay of inflation 
stabilization, which contradicts the ideas of Drazen and Grilli (1993) and the results of 
Veiga (2000). A possible justification for these results can be related with the 
indexation schemes and financial adaptation.28 Végh (1992) observes that chronic-
inflation countries learn to live with high inflation by adopting various indexation 
                                                 
28 These results may also be due to the definition of the dependent variable and its relation with the 
inflation variable. 
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mechanisms, which reduces the inflation costs and, consequently, the incentives to 
eradicate high inflation. Therefore, as the costs of high inflation are not completely 
revealed, due to those mechanisms, it is possible that neither the inflation level nor its 
growth present any impact on the delay of inflation stabilization.29 But when they are 
revealed, normally a stabilization program is implemented. So, it is possible that 
inflation has a positive effect on the probability of starting a stabilization program, as 
shown by Veiga (2000), but no effect on its delay. 
Tr/Imp(-1) has the wrong sign and is never statistically significant, providing no 
support for the Orphanides (1996a, 1996b) hypothesis that a low level of foreign 
reserves leads to delays of stabilization programs. 
TFC/Imp(-1) has the expected sign but is only statistically significant in the 
regression presented in column 2. Contrarily, Dur_aid is always statistically significant 
but its sign is contrary to the expected. This result could give some margin to argue that 
the persistence of the aid might help to reduce the delays, but that is not consistent with 
the results of the variables TFC/Imp(-1) and IMFProg (column 6). So, the impact of the 
external aid on delay is not clear. 
The control variables (GDP(-1), FB/GDP(-1), OPI) are always statistically 
significant. They show that the lower the growth of real GDP lagged one period, the 
higher the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP lagged one period, and the higher the 
oil price, the higher will be the delay of inflation stabilization. 
In order to verify the consistence of the results presented below, I perform a 
sensitivity analysis using the same specifications of columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. 
                                                 
29 Note that Drazen and Grilli (1993) also sustain that the inflation costs may hasten a stabilization only if 
no measures have been undertaken to reduce the costs associated with high inflation. 
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<Insert Table 4 around here> 
In the regressions presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, an alternative 
definition of high inflation is used: inflation is considered “high” if it is over twice the 
average inflation rate of the last 5 years (and superior to 25%) or greater than or equal to 
100%. In columns 3 and 4 Turkey and Israel are excluded from the sample, so that one 
could verify if the conclusions are the same when only Latin American countries are 
included. And, finally, in columns 5 and 6 all observations before 1970 are excluded, in 
order to verify if the results are maintained when one only considers the period in which 
the problems with chronic inflation became more severe. In all these cases, results are 
not significantly different from the ones presented in Table 3, which confirms the 
conclusions obtained there. 
Besides using of robust covariances to control for heteroscedasticity, the 
sensitivity of the tobit model to this problem induced me to estimate an heteroscedastic 
tobit model. In the general linear model, OLS estimates are consistent but not efficient 
when the disturbances are heteroscedastic. In the case of the limited dependent variable 
models, Maddala and Nelson (1975) showed that if one ignores heteroscedasticity, the 
resulting estimates are not even consistent. Considering this fact and the sensitivity of 
the tobit model to the heteroscedasticity, I decide to control for this problem more 
carefully. 
According to Maddala (1983), the solution for the heteroscedasticity problem 
consists on making some reasonable assumptions about the nature of the 
heteroscedasticity. A possible specification can be the following: 
(6)  ( )2i2i Zδγσ += , 
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in which γ  and δ  are parameters to be estimated and iZ  may include some or all of the 
variables in iX . A test for heteroscedasticity reduces to a test for 0=δ , which can be 
the likelihood-ratio test or the Wald test. The log-likelihood function is given by: 
(7)  
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This function is estimated by maximum likelihood for β , γ , and δ . 
The estimations for the heteroscedastic tobit are presented in Table 5,30 which 
presents two regressions using the same independent variables of Table 3, columns 1 
and 2. The variance function uses the variables which were statistically significant when 
included individually or jointly: Orient, QLChG, and FB/GDP(-1).31 
<Insert Table 5 around here> 
Results are still showing that the delay is greatly caused by political 
fragmentation, and that authoritarian regimes are more prone to hasten an inflation 
stabilization. The variables ∆Inf(-1) and Tr/Imp(-1) are not statistically significant, and 
the impact of the external aid on delay is not clear, confirming previous results. 
Furthermore, the control variables confirm the results presented in Table 3, columns 1 
and 2. 
However, Orient and QLChG are no longer statistically significant, which makes 
the partisan effects and the impact of the duration of the government mandate on the 
delay questionable, although previous results have indicated its presence. 
                                                 
30 The programming used to estimate the heteroscedastic tobit model is available in Castro (2002). 
31 Other variables were included in the variance function but the results were quite similar, preserving the 
main conclusions obtained here. 
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The likelihood-ratio tests for the hypothesis of the homoscedasticity ( 0=δ ), 
although not presented here, demonstrated the presence of heteroscedasticity. Thus, it is 
necessary to control for the heteroscedasticity in order to estimate the model correctly. 
Nevertheless, either controlling for heteroscedasticity using robust standard errors or 
with a heteroscedastic tobit model, the empirical results point out the important effect of 
political fragmentation on the Delay. Since a higher political fragmentation generates 
more conflicts and divergences, conflicts of interest can be considered as one of the 
main causes of the delays of inflation stabilizations in chronic inflation countries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The empirical results of the tobit estimations over a panel of 10 countries 
affected by chronic inflation clearly show that the higher the fragmentation of the 
political system and the number of political parties represented in the parliament, the 
longer will be the delays of inflation stabilizations. Since this higher fragmentation 
generates more political and economic conflicts and divergences, conflicts of interest 
can also be considered one of the main causes of the delays of inflation stabilizations in 
chronic inflation countries. This means that the results obtained in this work are in 
agreement with the political models of conflict, more precisely with the “war of 
attrition” model of Alesina and Drazen (1991), and with the findings of Veiga (2000). 
The evidence also shows that delays tend to be shorter in the authoritarian 
regimes that did not allow political parties, confirming the ideas of Haggard and 
Kaufman (1992). However, one must be aware that the social costs of an authoritarian 
regime could not compensate the benefits of an earlier stabilization and that political 
repression may not be the best way to implement sustainable economic reforms. 
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Some evidence is also obtained regarding the direct effects of political instability 
on delays. Although the heteroscedastic tobit estimations do not present any evidence, it 
may still exist, as it is shown by the previous results. Notice also that since higher 
political fragmentation tends to lead to greater political instability (according to Roubini 
and Sachs (1989)), the results present evidence supporting the idea that agreements are 
harder to obtain and stabilizations are delayed when there is political instability, which 
support the findings of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992). 
Contrary to my expectations, there is also some evidence that left-wing oriented 
governments are faster to stabilize high inflation than the right-wing oriented ones. 
According to Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), this situation may be possible, once 
sometimes substantial policy changes are implemented by parties with less reputation to 
implement them. However, as the heterocedastic tobit estimations reveal, the evidence 
of partisan effects on the delay is not clear. 
Concerning the economic variables, results clearly show that the lower the 
growth of real GDP, the higher the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, and the 
higher the oil price, the higher will be the delay of inflation stabilization. But, the 
evidence is not so obvious regarding the impact of external aid on delays. Actually, 
results show that its effects on delays are ambiguous: an ongoing aid program has no 
effects on delay; its duration has a positive effect; but the amount of credit seems to 
have a negative effect. The estimations also show that the available amount of foreign 
reserves has no impact on the delay of inflation stabilization, thus not confirming the 
hypothesis of Orphanides (1996a, 1996b) that foreign reserves are essential for 
hastening a stabilization. 
Finally, the empirical evidence does not support the assumption that a higher 
inflation growth contributes to diminish the delay. Results show that neither the 
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inflation level nor its growth has effects on the delay of inflation stabilization, which 
contradicts the ideas of Drazen and Grilli (1993) and the results of Veiga (2000). 
In conclusion, this work confirms that the structure of the political system helps 
to explain why sub-optimal (inflationary) policies are kept for long periods of time 
without the necessary corrective measures being implemented. Highly fragmented 
political systems and systems with a large number of parties represented in the 
parliament tend to present a higher political polarization and instability, which generates 
conflicts of interest. These conflicts between contending political parties make the 
approval of inflation stabilization measures harder and longer. Thus, this paper 
demonstrates that conflicts of interest are one of the main causes of the delays of 
inflation stabilizations in chronic inflation countries. 
This study could be extended to other situations in which it takes time to achieve 
the necessary consensus for the approval and adoption of other political measures that 
may have redistributive implications. 
It would also be interesting to do the same kind of work for other countries 
affected by chronic inflation, as some Eastern European countries. However, for these 
countries existing data are not enough and their quality is not always reliable, mainly for 
the years before the transition to a market economy. But, the high inflation levels 
registered in those countries are probably the result of the deep changes that affected 
their economies during (and after) their transition for a market economy and not the 
result of financing the deficit with seigniorage revenues, as it was the case of many 
Latin American countries. 
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Table 1: Inflation Stabilization Programs 
Country Program dates/names Type Durationa) Sourcesb) 
Argentina 1959:3 
1967:1 
1973:3 
1978:4 (Tablita) 
1985:2 (Austral I) 
1989:4 (Bonex) 
1991:2 (Convertibility) 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
MBS 
ERBS 
4 
0 
6 
15 
15 
10 
1 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Bolivia 1974:2 – no program 
1980:3 – no program 
1985:3 
 
 
ERBS 
5 
4 
14 
 
 
Végh (1992) 
Brazil 1964:1 
1986:1 (Cruzado) 
1990:1 (Collor) 
1994:3 (Real) 
ERBS 
ERBS 
MBS 
ERBS 
3 
25 
12 
14 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Ágénor and Montiel (1999) 
Chile 1975:2 
1978:1 (Tablita) 
MBS 
ERBS 
11 
0 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Dominican Rep. 1985:3 – no program 
1990:3 
 
MBS 
4 
10 
 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Israel 1985:3 (Shekel) ERBS 27 Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Mexico 1974:2 – no program 
1984:1 – no program 
1987:4 
 
 
ERBS 
2 
9 
7 
 
 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Peru 1981:3 – no program 
1985:3 
1990:3 
 
ERBS 
MBS 
23 
10 
11 
 
Agénor and Montiel (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Turkey 1980:1 
1995:1 – no program 
MBS 
 
10 
4 
Rodrik (1991) 
Uruguay 1960:4 
1968:2 
1973:3 – no program 
1978:4 (Tablita) 
1990:4 
MBS 
ERBS 
 
ERBS 
ERBS 
7 
11 
6 
0 
2 
Hoffmaister and Vegh (1996) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Notes: ERBS = Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization (17 in this sample); 
MBS = Money-Based Stabilization (7 in this sample). 
a) Duration refers to the duration of “high” inflation, in quarters, until the quarter before the 
implementation of an inflation stabilization program, or until the quarter in which inflation 
ceased to be “high” (no concrete program is implemented – see data in italic). 
b) See Castro and Veiga (forthcoming) for a more complete list of inflation stabilization 
programs referred in the literature. 
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Table 2: Description of the Variables Used 
Dependent variable: 
Delay – Delay of “high” inflation stabilization, measured by the duration of “high” inflation (in 
consecutive quarters) since the first quarter in which it is considered “high”, that is, since 
stabilization measures are considered clearly necessary, until a stabilization program started or 
inflation ceased to be “high”. 
Independent political variables: 
FPS – degree of Fragmentation of the Political System. 
FPS1 = 1 if no parties are allowed or there is only an exclusive one-party system, and = 0 for 
more fragmented political systems. 
FPS2 = 1 if there is a one-party majority parliamentary government or a presidential 
government, with the same party in control of the parliament (with an overall 
majority), and = 0 otherwise.  
FPS3 = 1 for more fragmented political systems, and = 0 if FPS1=1 or FPS2=1.  
FIP – Fragmentation index of the distribution of seats in the lower house of the parliament: 
FIP = 1/Σpi2, where pi = percentage of seats of party i. 
Orient = 1 for a right or center-right oriented government, and =0 otherwise. 
QLChG – Number of quarters since the last change in government or election. 
NGCh5 – Number of changes in government or elections that occurred in the last five years. 
ChLY = 1 if the change in government or election occurred in the last year, and =0 otherwise. 
Independent Economic variables: 
Inf – Growth of CPI since the same quarter of the previous year. 
∆Inf – Change in inflation:   ∆Inf = ln(Inf) - ln(Inf(-1)) 
TR/Imp – Ratio of Total Reserves to Imports. 
TFC/Imp – Total Fund (IMF) Credit and loans outstanding as a percentage of Imports. 
Dur_aid – Duration of IMF financial support (number of quarters). 
IMFProg = 1 if there is an ongoing IMF program (arrangement), and =0 otherwise. 
GDP – Growth of Real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year. 
FB/GDP – Fiscal Balance (Government Budget Balance) as a percentage of GDP. 
OPI – Oil Price Index (base 1989, US Dollars). 
Sources: 
- Dependent variable: see Table 1. 
- Political variables: Arthur Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World, several issues; Gorvin 
(1989); Haggard and Kaufman (1992); McDonald and Ruhl (1989); Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995); World Europa Yearbook, Europa, several issues. 
- Economic variables: International Financial Statistics - IMF. Quarterly data on Real GDP was 
also obtained from IBGE (Brazil) and INEGI (Mexico). Data on the timing of IMF 
arrangements was obtained from the IMF Annual Report (several issues) and on the IMF 
web page (http://www.imf.org). Data on Oil Price Index was obtained from the OECD 
Main Economic Indicators. 
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Table 3: Delays of Inflation Stabilization 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
FPS1 -7.83254 
(-6.25)*** 
[-1.575] 
 -8.07810 
(-6.40)*** 
[-1.624] 
-8.16611 
(-6,47)*** 
[-1.642] 
-7.82536 
(-6.23)*** 
[-1.574] 
-7.85129 
(-6.34)*** 
[-1.579] 
FPS2 -5.48322 
(-5.14)*** 
[-1.103] 
 -5.07537 
(-4.70)*** 
[-1.021] 
-5.38236 
(-4.98)*** 
[-1.082] 
-5.45953 
(-5.03)*** 
[-1.098] 
-5.39299 
(-5.10)*** 
[-1.084] 
FIP  0.897882 
(2.31)** 
[0.1805] 
    
Orient 3.05929 
(3.32)*** 
[0.6152] 
2.00568 
(2.19)** 
[0.4033] 
3.20020 
(3.38)*** 
[0.6435] 
3.16040 
(3.34)*** 
[0.6355] 
3.06736 
(3.32)*** 
[0.6168] 
2.53795 
(2.80)*** 
[0.5103] 
QLChG -0.260154 
(-3.96)*** 
[-0.0523] 
-0.245649 
(-3.81)*** 
[-0.0494] 
  -0.260202 
(-3.96)*** 
[-0.0523] 
-0.243416 
(-3.73)*** 
[-0.0489] 
NGCh5   1.55264 
(4.05)*** 
[0.3122] 
   
ChLY    1.80762 
(2.14)** 
[0.3635] 
  
∆Inf(-1) -0.009866 
(-0.29) 
[-0.0020] 
-0.021593 
(-0.57) 
[-0.0043] 
-0.024111 
(-0.68) 
[-0.0048] 
-0.012098 
(-0.35) 
[-0.0024] 
 0.009203 
(0.27) 
[0.0019] 
Inf(-1)     -0.000051 
(-0.14) 
[-0.00001] 
 
TR/Imp(-1) 0.407664 
(0.77) 
[0.0820] 
0.082792 
(0.15) 
[0.0166] 
0.046863 
(0.09) 
[0.0094] 
0.213476 
(0.39) 
[0.0429] 
0.407643 
(0.77) 
[0.0820] 
0.368842 
(0.72) 
[0.0722] 
TFC/Imp(-1) 1.25885 
(1.33) 
[0.2531] 
2.15169 
(2.14)** 
[0.4327] 
1.13779 
(1.17) 
[0.2288] 
1.32268 
(1.40) 
[0.2660] 
1.28388 
(1.32) 
[0.2582] 
 
Dur_aid -0.332250 
(-4.83)*** 
[-0.0668] 
-0.330006 
(-4.82)*** 
[-0.0664] 
-0.313143 
(-4.66)*** 
[-0.0630] 
-0.323120 
(-4.69)*** 
[-0.0650] 
-0.333292 
(-4.85)*** 
[-0.0670] 
 
IMFProg      0.495065 
(0.61) 
[0.0995] 
RGDP(-1) -0.371554 
(-4.63)*** 
[-0.0747] 
-0.396252 
(-4.95)*** 
[-0.0797] 
-0.398389 
(-4.91)*** 
[-0.0801] 
-0.384489 
(-4.68)*** 
[-0.0773] 
-0.373359 
(-4.53)*** 
[-0.0751] 
-0.434350 
(-5.51)*** 
[-0.0873] 
FB/GDP(-1) -0.768506 
(-8.62)*** 
[-0.1545] 
-0.840917 
(-9.39)*** 
[-0.1691] 
-0.733752 
(-7.80)*** 
[-0.1475] 
-0.807775 
(-9.09)*** 
[-0.1624] 
-0.770886 
(-8.65)*** 
[-0.1550] 
-0.798192 
(-9.06)*** 
[-0.1605] 
OPI 0.093698 
(6.48)*** 
[0.0188] 
0.084900 
(5.70)*** 
[0.0171] 
0.090640 
(6.23)*** 
[0.0182] 
0.098747 
(6.81)*** 
[0.0199] 
0.093656 
(6.48)*** 
[0.0188] 
0.086278 
(6.15)*** 
[0.0173] 
Sigma 9.00477 
(23.96)*** 
9.30954 
(23.88)*** 
9.04868 
(23.99)*** 
9.11981 
(23.77)*** 
9.00598 
(23.97)*** 
9.00870 
(23.55)*** 
Log Likelihood -1344.60 -1363.35 -1345.82 -1350.54 -1344.59 -1353.63 
Schwartz B.I.C. 1432.17 1447.28 1433.39 1438.11 1432.16 1437.56 
McFadden R2 0.1814 0.1700 0.1807 0.1778 0.1814 0.1759 
No. Observations 1477 1477 1477 1477 1477 1477 
No. Positive Observ. 297 297 297 297 297 297 
Sources: see Tables 1 and 2. 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; the marginal effects are in brackets; significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; models estimated with a constant, 9 country dummies and 3 
temporal dummies, by maximum likelihood (ML); Sigma represents the estimated standard-error for the residuals. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
FPS1 -5.22429 
(-4.49)*** 
[-0.9798] 
 -6.44144 
(-5.18)*** 
[-1.356] 
 -7.17541 
(-5.22)*** 
[-1.731] 
 
FPS2 -4.44266 
(-4.46)*** 
[-0.8332] 
 -4.38533 
(-4.02)*** 
[-0.9228] 
 -9.15869 
(-8.45)*** 
[-2.210] 
 
FIP  0.119020 
(0.33) 
[0.0223] 
 0.871594 
(2.27)** 
[0.1834] 
 1.14691 
(2.64)*** 
[0.2767] 
Orient 2.43173 
(2.75)*** 
[0.4561] 
1.56099 
(1.81)* 
[0.2928] 
1.93397 
(2.06)** 
[0.4070] 
1.20959 
(1.31) 
[0.2545] 
3.82486 
(4.06)*** 
[0.9228] 
2.83539 
(2.97)*** 
[0.6841] 
QLChG -0.154759 
(-2.62)*** 
[-0.0290] 
-0.155067 
(-2.72)*** 
[-0.0291] 
-0.277709 
(-4.20)*** 
[-0.0584] 
-0.263457 
(-4.07)*** 
[-0.0554] 
-0.273504 
(-4.46)*** 
[-0.0660] 
-0.236818 
(-3.79)*** 
[-0.0571] 
∆Inf(-1) -0.003380 
(-0.11) 
[-0.0006] 
-0.016779 
(-0.50) 
[-0.0031] 
-0.022791 
(-0.67) 
[-0.0048] 
-0.029814 
(-0.80) 
[-0.0063] 
0.726254 
(1.53) 
[0.1752] 
0.577684 
(1.01) 
[0.1394] 
TR/Imp(-1) 0.396489 
(0.79) 
[0.0744] 
0.210366 
(0.41) 
[0.0395] 
0.578006 
(1.04) 
[0.1216] 
0.247417 
(0.43) 
[0.0521] 
-0.140046 
(-0.26) 
[-0.0338] 
-0.231129 
(-0.39) 
[-0.0558] 
TFC/Imp(-1) 0.468198 
(0.51) 
[0.0878] 
1.19820 
(1.25) 
[0.2247] 
1.76712 
(1.94)* 
[0.3719] 
2.22484 
(2.31)** 
[0.4682] 
2.02935 
(2.17)** 
[0.4896] 
3.06652 
(3.05)*** 
[0.7398] 
Dur_aid -0.320810 
(-4.66)*** 
[-0.0602] 
-0.331508 
(-5.02)*** 
[-0.0622] 
-0.270077 
(-4.05)*** 
[-0.0568] 
-0.239978 
(-3.66)*** 
[-0.0505] 
-0.125152 
(-1.84)* 
[-0.0302] 
-0.181574 
(-2.66)*** 
[-0.0438] 
RGDP(-1) -0.388199 
(-5.30)*** 
[-0.0728] 
-0.416741 
(-5.65)*** 
[-0.0782] 
-0.347193 
(-4.37)*** 
[-0.0731] 
-0.358036 
(-4.54)*** 
[-0.0753] 
-0.233669 
(-2.78)*** 
[-0.0564] 
-0.322177 
(-3.81)*** 
[-0.0777] 
FB/GDP(-1) -0.821451 
(-10.02)*** 
[-0.1541] 
-0.905549 
(-10.88)*** 
[-0.1698] 
-0.655982 
(-6.65)*** 
[-0.1380] 
-0.698094 
(-6.98)*** 
[-0.1469] 
-0.748161 
(-8.59)*** 
[-0.1805] 
-0.854611 
(-9.50)*** 
[-0.2062] 
OPI 0.046908 
(3.57)*** 
[0.0088] 
0.037389 
(2.76)*** 
[0.0070] 
0.063875 
(4.05)*** 
[0.0134] 
0.052404 
(3.29)*** 
[0.0110] 
0.091156 
(6.40)*** 
[0.0220] 
0.083986 
(5.79)*** 
[0.0203] 
Sigma 8.41102 
(21.72)*** 
8.58206 
(21.68)*** 
8.49152 
(23.33)*** 
8.73093 
(22.78)*** 
8.32062 
(22.53)*** 
8.82930 
(22.72)*** 
Log Likelihood -1258.41 -1271.10 -1137.01 -1148.26 -1188.86 -1220.29 
Schwartz B.I.C. 1345.99 1355.03 1215.06 1222.76 1269.85 1297.76 
McFadden R2 0.1708 0.1625 0.1710 0.1628 0.1942 0.1729 
No. Observations 1477 1477 1207 1207 1144 1144 
No. Positive Observ. 277 277 254 254 276 276 
Sources: see Tables 1 and 2. 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; the marginal effects are in brackets; significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; models estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) with a 
constant, 9 country dummies and 3 temporal dummies (columns 1 and 2); 7 country dummies and 3 temporal 
dummies (columns 3 and 4); and 9 country dummies and 2 temporal dummies (columns 5 and 6); Sigma represents 
the estimated standard-error for the residuals. 
In columns 1 and 2 inflation is considered “high” if it is over twice the average inflation rate of the last five years 
or greater than 100 percent; in columns 3 and 4 Turkey and Israel are excluded from the sample; and in columns 5 
and 6 are excluded all observations before 1970. 
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Table 5: Heteroscedastic Tobit for the Delays of Inflation Stabilization 
 1a) 1b) 2a) 2b) 
FPS1 -8.30171 
(-6.17)*** 
[-1.669] 
   
FPS2 -5.36077 
(-4.24)*** 
[-1.078] 
   
FIP   1.27129 
(2.62)*** 
[0.2556] 
 
Orient 1.26753 
(0.64) 
[0.2549] 
3.58076 
(3.31)*** 
0.817699 
(0.42) 
[0.1644] 
3.42838 
(2.88)*** 
QLChG 0.025767 
(0.21) 
[0.0052] 
-0.268081 
(-3.17)*** 
0.076641 
(0.56) 
[0.0154] 
-0.305459 
(-3.14)*** 
∆Inf(-1) -0.016167 
(-0.30) 
[-0.0033] 
 -0.016127 
(-0.28) 
[-0.0032] 
 
TR/Imp(-1) -0.080466 
(-0.12) 
[-0.0162] 
 0.675983 
(0.91) 
[0.1359] 
 
TFC/Imp(-1) 1.88908 
(1.64) 
[0.3799] 
 3.45007 
(2.63)*** 
[0.6938] 
 
Dur_aid -0.317944 
(-3.22)*** 
[-0.0639] 
 -0.357288 
(-3.39)*** 
[-0.0718] 
 
RGDP(-1) -0.261466 
(-3.56)*** 
[-0.0526] 
 -0.279644 
(-3.54)*** 
[-0.0562] 
 
FB/GDP(-1) -0.836331 
(-6.50)*** 
[-0.1682] 
0.184203 
(1.91)* 
-0.906565 
(-6.55)*** 
[-0.1823] 
0.210917 
(2.22)** 
OPI 0.129893 
(7.76)*** 
[0.0261] 
 0.117461 
(7.47)*** 
[0.0236] 
 
Gama  9.86962 
(6.48)*** 
 10.7474 
(6.71)*** 
Log Likelihood -1324.07 -1341.04 
Schwartz B.I.C. 1426.24 1439.56 
McFadden R2 0.1939 0.1836 
No. Observations 1477 1477 
No. Positive Observ. 297 297 
Sources: see Tables 1 and 2. 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; the marginal effects are in brackets; significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; models estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) with a 
constant, 9 country dummies and 3 temporal dummies. 
In columns 1a) and 2a) are presented the estimated coefficients for each independent variable; in columns 1b) and 
2b) are presented the estimated coefficients for the variance function used. 
 
 
 
